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During the Cold War, it was widely acknowledged that the advent of 
nuclear weaponry had fundamentally altered the nature of war between 
nuclear armed nations. However, while strategic nuclear war planning 
was being carried out and implemented in deployed weaponry and per-
sonnel by the United States, parallel to this was the continued embrace 
of military strategies that had been elemental to the conduct and vic-
tory in Europe during World War Two. This article argues that at the 
same time while nuclear weapons dramatically altered the war planning 
of the United States during the Cold War, for Army battlefield com-
manders there was little departure from pre-existing doctrines regard-
ing the defence of Central Europe. For these battlefield commanders, 
the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons was largely overlaid upon 
existing strategies to repel an imagined Soviet incursion. Focusing on 
discussions of battlefield nuclear tactics by Army strategists, the paper 
demonstrates that such planning persisted and was even embedded 
into training throughout the first half of the Cold War, and far beyond 
the entry of thermonuclear weaponry into the U.S. arsenal. The paper 
specifically looks at the training and participation of ground forces in 
nuclear weapon testing to acclimate them to the “atomic battlefield.” 
Through an examination of the indoctrination that these forces received 
about nuclear weapon effects, and specifically around the dangers posed 
by radiation, it becomes clear that the realities of nuclear weaponry had 
little effect on the preparation, training and strategies of American mili-
tary leaders tasked with the military defence of Central Europe against 
Soviet incursion.
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Immediately after the surrender of Japan in World War Two, the United 
States military conducted extensive studies of the impact of the two 
nuclear attacks on Japan that were carried out in the final weeks of the 
war. “[A]tomic weapons will not have eliminated the need for ground 
troops, for surface vessels, for air weapons, or for the full coordination 
among them, the supporting services and the civilian effort, but will 
have changed the context in which they are employed to such a degree 
that radically changed equipment, training and tactics will be required,” 
declared the report.1 But did it? To what degree, and how quickly did the 
advent of nuclear weapons alter the war planning and preparations of the 
United States from their military posture during World War Two?
In August of 1945 most Americans, including many political and 
military leaders, believed that nuclear weapons compelled the Japanese 
to surrender and ended World War Two. The initial discourse around 
nuclear weaponry presented to the American public stressed the revolu-
tionary nature of the new weapon. President Harry Truman, in announc-
ing the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and introducing the world to the 
atomic bomb described it in quasi-religious language, saying that it har-
nessed the “basic power of the universe” and was given to America by 
God, while banner headlines across the United States heralded the use of 
these atomic weapons as dealing a “knockout blow” to Japan, or of being 
a “super weapon” capable of undreamed of destruction, compelling an 
entrenched Japan to surrender.2
1 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (The Pacific War) (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946): 30.
2 “Text of Statements by Truman, Stimson on Development of Atomic Bombs,” New York 
Times, 7 August 1945, 4. There is copious literature around the use of nuclear weapons in Japan, 
and on the subsequent development and deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States 
throughout the Cold War. Classic works on the use of the bomb in Japan include, Gar Alp-
erovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); 
Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The atomic bomb and the grand alliance (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1973); and more recently, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman 
and the surrender of Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). On nuclear weapons 
as cultural signifiers in the United States see, Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: Ameri-
can thought and culture at the dawn of the atomic age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985); Ira 
Chernus, Dr. Strangegod: On the symbolic meaning of nuclear weapons (Columbia, SC: Uni-
versity of South Carolina Press, 1986); Robert Jacobs, The Dragon’s Tail: Americans face the 
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Nuclear weapons were imagined to be a civilization altering tech-
nology. Renowned CBS war correspondent William L. Shirer was 
among those on the air reporting on the use of the bomb after the offi-
cial announcement about Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Shaken by the 
description of the power of the new weapon, and cognizant of the devas-
tations of warfare, Shirer asked his nationwide radio audience, in a world 
with nuclear weapons: “Is there any hope for mankind?”3 Military analyst 
Major George Fielding Eliot claimed in the New York Herald Tribune that 
“Mankind stands at the crossroads of destiny…The decisions which now 
confront the mind of man are the most important in his history. Upon 
these decisions hangs his continued existence on this planet.”4
However, while this apocalyptic and transformational rhetoric typi-
fied representations of nuclear weapons in the American press, the inte-
gration of the new weapons into military doctrine lagged behind popular 
discourse. This trajectory was explicitly outlined in one of the first books 
to consider the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations and 
military strategy, The Absolute Weapon published in 1946. Writing in The 
Absolute Weapon, editor Bernard Brodie outlined the then common wis-
dom, “It is already known to us all that a war with atomic bombs would 
be immeasurably more destructive and horrible than any the world has 
yet known. That fact is portentous, and to many it is overwhelming. But 
as a datum for the formulation of policy it is in itself of strictly limited 
utility.”5 This statement would prove more prescient than Brodie him-
self intended. Even as the destructive capacity of nuclear weaponry and 
atomic age (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010). As for the primacy of 
nuclear weapons in the Cold War see, Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The atomic bomb 
in the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Random House, 1981); Campbell Craig and Fredrik 
Logevall, America’s Cold War: The politics of insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2012). Essential work is also being conducted by the National Security Archive at George 
Washington University.
3 William L. Shirer on CBS Radio, 6 Aug. 1945, quoted in Wilber M. Smith, The Atomic Bomb 
and the Word of God (Chicago: Moody Press, 1945), 8.
4 George Fielding Eliot, “Atomic Bomb Said to Overthrow Basic Tenets of Military Science,” 
New York Herald Tribune, quoted in Donald Porter Geddes, ed., The Atomic Age Opens (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1945), 166.
5 Bernard Brodie (ed.), The Absolute Weapon: Atomic power and world order (New York: Har-
court, Brace and Company, 1946), 21.
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the complexity of nuclear delivery systems progressed far beyond any-
thing imagined in 1945, aspects of American military planning remained 
trapped in efforts to insert the new weapons into existing war fighting 
doctrines fixated on the battles of World War Two.
Brodie argued in 1946 that World War Two and the atomic bomb in 
particular had shown the primacy of strategic bombing. He argued against 
understanding nuclear weapons as inherently transformative, asserting 
that they could accomplish essentially the same goals as previously exist-
ing strategic bombing simply in a more condensed timeline. Nonethe-
less, military planners began in the late 1940s to prepare for a possible 
Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and a long drawn out land war in 
Germany. This imagined war mirrored the European theatre of World 
War Two, with nuclear weapons added, not as a radical or transforma-
tive component, but as simply a new weapon in the arsenal. A top secret 
memo prepared by the staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the 
National Security Council entitled “A Study of the Management and Ter-
mination of War with the Soviet Union,” prepared in 1963, included a sce-
nario titled “War in Europe.” In this scenario, a communist move to take 
over the government of Italy results in a military confrontation between 
the Soviet Union and NATO. As the situation escalates the United States 
decides to use tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces in Eastern 
Europe. “The Presidential decision to authorize the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons resulted from the belief that not only would this action reverse 
the local military situation but would put serious pressure on the Soviets 
to close out the war.”6 The scenario did eventuate in the further use of 
limited numbers of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union itself, this lim-
ited use ultimately compelled the Soviet Union to withdraw entirely from 
Eastern Europe and from operating in any manner in Western Europe.
Even as thermonuclear weapons and missiles came to dominate Amer-
ican nuclear strategizing, it took decades for the US to loosen its grip on 
the idea of Germany as a nuclear battlefield in a World War Three ground 
war. In 1956, the Chief of Staff of the Army Maxwell Taylor approved the 
6 Net Evaluation Subcommittee, “A Study of the Management and Termination of War with 
the Soviet Union,” (November 15, 1963): 23–24.
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PENTANA concept as discussed in the 1955 report titled, “Doctrinal and 
Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army During the Period 
1960–1970”. Taylor was seeking a means of organizationally formalizing 
the capacity to integrate tactical nuclear weapons into combat groups. 
Completed in December 1955, the Army War College study called for a 
completely air transportable 8,600-man division to replace infantry, air-
borne, and armoured divisions. The new division was to be built around 
five small, self-sufficient battle groups that would include their own artil-
lery. The battle groups were to meet the tactical requirements for dispersion 
of forces, operations in depth, and increased flexibility and mobility on the 
atomic battlefield. Organic division artillery, although meagre, included 
the Honest John, a surface-to-surface rocket with a nuclear warhead.7
The “Flexible Response” doctrine adopted during the Kennedy 
administration moved the United States towards planning for a range 
of possible scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons beyond the Eisen-
hower administrations emphasis on massive retaliation. Speaking at the 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Symposium convened by the United States’ 
Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory in 1969, Colonel Stanley D. Fair of the US Army 
Combat Developments Command told attendees, “The need for the tac-
tical nuclear option was most obvious in those situations that portrayed 
such numerically superior enemy strength that US and Allied Forces 
were inadequate to achieve a favourable outcome. In addition, the sce-
narios suggest that a tactical nuclear capability is needed to terminate 
conventional aggression before the conflict can expand to involve other 
areas or other combatants and to avoid a prolonged nonnuclear war.”8
After the initial use of nuclear weapons during World War Two, the 
United States not only put the model of nuclear weapon used in Nagasaki 
into mass production (the Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons were of com-
pletely different design and used different nuclear material to generate the 
7 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The evolution of divisions and separate brigades 
(Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1998), 271.
8 Stanley D. Fair, “Tactical Concepts in Theater Operations,” Proceedings of the Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons Symposium (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 3–5 September 1969), LA-
4350-LS: 30.
171Imagining a Nuclear World WarTwo in Europe
explosions, after the war the Nagasaki design was chosen as the variant to 
pursue in early post-war manufacturing), but also designed new nuclear 
weapons specifically intended for use on battlefields in support of ground 
operations. This was accomplished through miniaturizing the designs of 
larger yield weapons and designing delivery systems suited to various tacti-
cal uses such as backpacks for delivery to naval targets and the M65 atomic 
canon which was deployed to bases in Europe. Additionally, in the early 
1950s the U.S. began a program of troop participation in nuclear testing 
at the Nevada Test Site that both acclimated troops to nuclear detonations, 
trained them in tactics imagined as essential on “nuclear battlefields,” and 
gauged their physical and psychological capacity to follow orders and 
execute complex manoeuvres in the presence of nuclear devastation and 
nuclear radiation. Throughout the Cold War, even into the 1980s, a nuclear 
ground war fought against an imagined Soviet incursion into Germany 
remained a fixture of both the U.S. nuclear stance and NATO war gaming.
Nuclear World War Two
While grasping the importance of strategic bombing to war planning 
with the Soviet Union in a post-World War Two world, American mili-
tary planners envisioned atomic bombs as accomplishing these goals 
with more force and quicker than previous ordnance. As the Iron Curtain 
came to define the borders of empire in the emerging Cold War, Ameri-
can strategists envisioned conflict with the Soviet Union as resulting from 
a Russian incursion into Western Europe. Initially nuclear policy under-
stood atomic bombs to act as a deterrent to Soviet superiority in con-
ventional military strength. In this scenario, nuclear weapons might be 
used to attack Soviet cities directly, but also would find a role in shaping 
outcomes on the battlefield such as in destroying armoured formations or 
bases. Later came deep-strike missions (e.g. from GLCMs and medium 
range bombers) and discussions about maritime use.
In a 1957 article in Military Review: The Professional Journal of the 
U.S. Army, Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Walker of the U.S. Army Com-
mand and General Staff College wrote about how nuclear weapons would 
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be an effective counter to a favoured tactic of the Red Army in World 
War Two. “Of particular interest was the Russian use of the night attack. 
They crossed the Dnepr River at night without the use of bridge equip-
ment, and in 1943 accomplished another major river crossing and deci-
sive breakthrough of German lines with tanks at night…In the atomic 
situation an understanding of the conduct of night attacks will be of vital 
necessity to the frontline commander.” Walker goes on to advise that, 
“there is a good case for the retention of the battle-tried tactics of World 
War Two, superimposing on them the different tactics required for a pos-
sible atomic conflict.”9
This thinking persisted deep into the Cold War, even beyond the 
development of thermonuclear weapons, which would make a U.S.–Soviet 
encounter on the “battlefield” of Europe far less likely. “Even with the 
development of the thermonuclear bomb, which increases many times the 
power of the original atomic weapon, our problem is not solved,” advised 
Army Captain Thomas M. Waitt, downplaying the fact that thermonu-
clear weapons are thousands of times more powerful than fission weap-
ons and not simply several times more powerful. Waitt continued, “Our 
enemy will, perhaps, be holding the territory of our allies. We will have to 
fight ground battles to defeat him.” He imagined that, “Coordinated land, 
sea and air forces will be required. Since we must fight our battles on the 
ground, we want to use atomic power to help accomplish our mission.”10
Traditional military doctrine pervaded attempts at integrating 
nuclear weapons as radical additions to armaments of warfare. “The 
same over-all mission of the rifle squad on the atomic battlefield remains 
much the same as in the past, with few modifications to keep step with 
the faster tempo imposed by swifter means of transportation and greater 
destructive force,” wrote Colonel George W. Dickerson.11 Marine Colo-
nel George C. Reinhardt emphasized the same continuity, arguing the 
9 Robert M. Walker, “The Night Attack Blueprint for Atomic Victory,” Military Review 37:7 
(1957): 52–56.
10 Thomas M. Waitt, “Deep Thrust with a One-Two Punch–that’s the Atomic-Airborne Team,” 
Army 7:5 (1957): 80–83.
11 George W. Dickerson, “Squads in Atomic Battle: The Training of the Pentomic Squad,” 
Army 8:4 (1957): 31.
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changes necessitated on the atomic battlefield actually reinforced exist-
ing doctrines, “Increasing deadliness of weapons has for years required 
dispersion on the battlefield, but it never ‘protected’ any individual from 
a bullet. ‘Extended order’ replaced close lines so that a bullet aimed at 
one man would be less likely to hit his neighbour. It ‘protected’ the battal-
ion from destruction by enemy machine guns, if you can use protection 
in that sense, but it never protected the individual soldier. Dispersion in 
atomic warfare does not alter that principle.”12 Lieutenant Colonel Rob-
ert B. Rigg advised commanders that, “Your men must recognize atomic 
tactical weapons as supplementing and not supplanting their role in the 
ground services.”13 Describing a NATO repulsion of a Soviet incur-
sion into Germany and the use of nuclear weapons, Army Colonel T. C. 
Mataxis envisioned that the tactics employed by soldiers under atomic 
attack would follow traditional procedures, “In case of a large-scale 
enemy attack supported by atomic weapons, plans must provide for the 
possibility of an entire reserve’s occupying blocking positions, relying on 
the next higher unit to execute the counterattack.”14
To be sure, these were not the only views being expressed among 
American military commanders. Many of these ideas were being expressed 
by senior Army personnel who were feeling their funding and status being 
usurped by the new Air Force, and especially by the Strategic Air Com-
mand (SAC) that had the primary task of waging nuclear war against the 
Soviet Union. However, to understand the distance between the military 
planning of these battlefield commanders and SAC commanders at this 
very same time, it is useful to consider U.S. nuclear warfighting strate-
gies as SAC had developed them, even before most of these articles were 
written. After attending a SAC briefing in March of 1954 Captain Wil-
liam B. Moore, Executive Assistant to the Director of the Atomic Energy 
Division of the U.S. Navy, wrote to his superiors that in the “optimum 
plan” of the Strategic Air Command for attacking the Soviet Union, “It 
was estimated that SAC could lay down an attack under these conditions 
12 George C. Reinhardt, “Tomorrow’s Atomic Battlefield,” Marine Corp. Gazette 38:3 
(1954): 17.
13 Robert B. Rigg, “Simulating Atomic Blast Effects,” Army Information Digest 10: 9 (1955): 19.
14 T. C. Mataxis, “Defense on the Atomic Battlefield,” Infantry School Quarterly 46:3 (1956): 61.
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of 600–750 bombs by approaching Russia from many directions so as to 
hit their early warning screen simultaneously. It would require about two 
hours from this moment until bombs had been dropped using a bomb-
as-you-go system in which both BRAVO and DELTA targets would be hit 
as they reached them.” Moore concluded, “The final impression was that 
virtually all of Russia would be nothing but a smoking, radiating ruin at 
the end of two hours.”15
The Army’s means of participating in the new nuclear potential was 
focused on tactical –battlefield – nuclear weapons. Speaking about the 
280 mm atomic cannon, Sgt. Bernard Henry bragged that, “We can get 
her emplaced and into firing action a whale of a lot faster than we can any 
other artillery gun now in use.”16 Colonel Mataxis described these battle-
field nuclear weapons as immensely practical, “In addition to air delivery 
of an atomic bomb by the Air Force, the Army has today the Corporal 
guided missile, the Honest John rocket and the 280mm gun. These weap-
ons are in the hands of our troops in the field. Realizing this, let us first 
analyse the effects of the tactical employment of atomic weapons on our 
current organizations and doctrine of defense and then examine a situa-
tion showing the actual planning of a battlefield atomic strike.” Mataxis 
then proceeds to war game the battlefield usage of tactical nuclear weap-
ons, “in order to best illustrate the detailed planning and coordination 
necessary when using atomic weapons in support of a field army, visu-
alize the following situation. Following the normal pattern of concen-
tration for the routine spring maneuvers in eastern Europe, aggressor 
forces launch a surprise attack supported by heavy bombing raids with 
conventional weapons on all NATO airfields, communication and sup-
ply centers.”17 Mataxis then war games a battlefield nuclear confrontation 
between the Red Army and NATO troops in Germany. Mataxis’ article is 
written a full two years after the SAC briefing described above.
15 Quoted in David Rosenberg, “A Smoking, Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours: Docu-
ments on American war plans for nuclear war with the Soviet Union, 1954–55,” International 
Security 6:3 (Winter 1981/82): 25.
16 Quoted in, Frank W. Penniman, “Atomic Cannoneers,” Life of the Soldier and Airman 36:1 
(1954), 11.
17 Metaxis, “Defense on the Atomic Battlefield,” 62.
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War gaming with soldiers and real nuclear weapons
In response to the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1949 and to 
prepare to fight a battlefield nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the US 
Army undertook a program of troop participation in nuclear weapon 
tests at the newly created Nevada Test Site in 1951. There were several 
reasons to begin to expose troops to nuclear weapons. The first was to 
give real world experience to battlefield commanders and troops in the 
new roles necessitated by the radiation effects of nuclear weapons. This 
included members of the Chemical Corps who were charged with sur-
veying the radiological contamination of weapon use and determining 
threats to troop manoeuvres. Each commander was responsible for the 
training of his own survey personnel and participation in nuclear tests 
allowed those personnel to encounter and train with actual radiation. 
However, the lack of a centralized training regime left the quality of indi-
vidual radiation monitors in various units inconsistent.18
Participation in nuclear tests also allowed battlefield commanders 
to gain experience in how the effects of nuclear weapons would both 
limit and enable battlefield manoeuvres. Beyond this, exposure to actual 
nuclear weapon detonations was seen as necessary to psychologically 
condition troops to perform in the presence of the new weapons. “Psy-
chological condition of troops to permit exploitation in defense of atomic 
weapons is essential,” wrote Brigade General R.W. Porter, Jr., “To achieve 
this, false notions as to radiation and other dangerous characteristics of 
atomic weapons must be dispelled.”19 This dismissal of the serious nature 
of the threat of radiation from tactical nuclear weapon use can be seen 
in the 1953 book, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, which claimed that, 
“The duration of dust cloud (fall-out) contamination is usually short…
radioactive decay (half-life span) is usually swift enough to permit early 
use of equipment without taking special measures.”20
18 Stanley W. Fair, “Measuring Radiation,” Army 9:8 (1958): 72.
19 R.W. Porter, Jr., “Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, Review,” Armor 62:6 (1953): 57.
20 George C. Reinhardt and W.R. Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (Harrisburg, PA: 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1953): 142.
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At first, in 1952, troops were kept at a distance of ten miles from the 
detonation points, and simply observed the nuclear tests. However, within 
one year the troops were being stationed as close as three miles from the 
test epicentres. Test site personnel objected to troops being so close to 
the detonations, and responsibility for their wellbeing was transferred 
from test site personnel, many of whom were scientists, to military com-
manders. Eventually troops were placed in foxholes at what was judged 
to be the periphery of the weapon’s effects, and following the detonation 
manoeuvres were carried out on the “atomic battlefield.”
For many of the soldiers involved, the experience of participating in 
a nuclear test was a very existential experience. “I was sitting in a row of 
sandbags, facing away, my forearm covering my eyes even though they were 
closed,” wrote Captain Harry Olmsted, “Just after the final tone squeezed 
through the sound system I was conscious of an unbelievable white, sear-
ing light. It was dark, but yet it was light. I felt isolated and alone because 
of the complete silence all around me. For a time that seemed like a full 
minute but was actually only a few seconds, I tried to close my eyes even 
tighter. A hurried voice told us to turn around slowly and open our eyes. 
This voice was joined by probably a hundred others, each a little louder and 
a little faster. Now I saw what was undoubtedly the most astounding sight I 
had eve(r) seen.”21 Many soldiers recount seeing their bones through their 
closed eyes as the flash and burst of gamma radiation and x-rays from the 
detonation enveloped them. Master Sergeant Roy Heinecke reports that a 
Marine Colonel he interviewed described how, “I instinctively closed my 
eyes as the blinding light hit, yet I could still see the pebbles and small rocks 
around my feet. Nothing could be done to get away from it.”22
Following the detonation, the troops would frequently rise out of 
their foxholes and advance towards ground zero. Official reports of the 
manoeuvres of Desert Rock V, as described by MSgt. Heinecke above 
stated that: “For the tower shots the men remained kneeling in the 
trenches until the shock wave from the explosion had passed over the 
trenches. At this point they were allowed to rise from their trenches to 
21 Harry E. Olmsted, “Test Shot Smokey,” Army Information Digest 12:12 (1957): 17.
22 Roy E. Heinecke, “Desert Rock V,” Leatherneck 36:7 (1953): 35.
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watch the atomic cloud. After the forward area had been monitored, they 
were ordered to advance in simulated attack toward ground zero. Upon 
reaching this forward area, they inspected the damage done to animals 
and equipment in the area, and then returned to camp by truck. Within 
24 to 48 hours after a shot, most of the participants were on their way 
back to their home stations.”23
In many of these manoeuvres, the following scenario was modelled. 
American and Soviet troops were opposed to each other on a tradi-
tional battlefield with a traditional front line. An American commander 
decides to use a nuclear weapon to breach the enemy’s lines. American 
troops dig in to prepare for nuclear assault. When the nuclear detona-
tion creates a devastating hole in the enemy’s line, infantry and airborne 
troops advance through the hole. However, this scenario involved troops 
advancing directly into the epicentre of the nuclear detonation even as 
the mushroom cloud rises above it.
One internal assessment of the value of the participation on Marines 
in a nuclear test in Nevada in 1955, concluded that, “The experience of 
Brigade troops in participating with an actual nuclear detonation served 
to familiarize them with the phenomena incident to it, as well as its effects. 
In observing the effects thereof on the displayed demonstration material 
troops were familiarized with realistic means of the passive defense mea-
sures which serve to minimize or protect against the effects of atomic 
explosion. It served to remove apprehensions concerning the capability of 
the weapon. All hands gained a high degree of appreciation of its power as 
well as its limitations and its proper place in the family of weapons, both 
nuclear and conventional, available to the Marine Corps.”24
A second scenario involved the use of both a low yield and then a 
high yield nuclear device, a tactic described by Lt. Col. George B. Pick-
ett, Jr. as “squeeze ‘em an’ blast ‘em.”25 This tactic involved the use of a 
23 Benjamin W. White, Desert Rock V: Reactions of troop participants and forward volunteer 
officer groups to atomic exercises, Fort Ord, CA: Army Field Forces Human Research Unit No.2 
(1953), 1.
24 United States Government, Exercise Desert Rock VI: Marine Corps. Report (March 1955): 
VII–1.
25 George B. Pickett, Jr., “Squeeze ‘Em an’ Blast ‘Em,” Military Review 35:6 (1955): 58.
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low yield nuclear weapon to force an enemy to withdraw front line per-
sonnel and equipment to a rear area that was also a command location. 
Once the enemy’s forces had been “squeezed” into this rear area, which 
had now become a nuclear killing ground, a larger yield nuclear weapon 
would be used to destroy the enemies command and artillery units in 
a single blow.
In 1953, the United States conducted its only test of an artillery fired 
tactical nuclear weapon, the Grable Test at the Nevada Test Site, fired 
from an M65  280 mm atomic cannon and utilizing a Mark 9 nuclear 
weapon. While it was described as a tactical, battlefield weapon, its yield 
was 15 kt, or roughly the same size as the Hiroshima weapon. Nuclear 
artillery shells were later distributed to forward locations on NATO bases 
in Western Europe. The United States also built tactical nuclear weap-
ons in the sub-kiloton range such as the bazooka fired Davy Crocket 
which fired an M388 nuclear weapon, and the SADM (Special Atomic 
Demolition Munition) which could be placed in a backpack and car-
ried by infantrymen, or taken underwater by navy divers and attached to 
naval vessels.
During the course of American atmospheric nuclear weapon testing 
several hundred thousand military personnel took part in nuclear weapon 
tests in both Nevada and the original American test site in the Marshall 
Islands where the U.S. conducted tests from 1946 to 1957, including all of 
its tests of thermonuclear weapons. While the United States did not track 
the subsequent health progression of the troops it placed in close proxim-
ity to nuclear weapons, it did engage in extensive studies of the psychol-
ogy of those soldiers, as will be discussed in the following section. Many 
of the soldiers who took part in nuclear weapon testing suffered illnesses 
related to exposures to radiation. Most of these illnesses were the result 
of internalized alpha-emitting and beta particles, whose resulting disease 
presentation typically unfolded over decades and involved ingestion can-
cers that cannot be causally attributed to their internalization of radionu-
clides. Proper understanding of the disease burden borne by these troops 
could only be demonstrated through long-term epidemiological studies 
involving most of the participating service personnel, similar to the stud-
ies conducted on the survivors of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and 
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Nagasaki. As the subsequent health care provider to most of these veter-
ans, the U.S. government was uniquely positioned to conduct such fol-
low up assessments, but neglected to pursue this, or to compensate most 
personnel for later illnesses.
The psychological indoctrination of atomic soldiers
While the battlefield usage of nuclear weapons followed closely behind 
strategies for smaller ordnance, the US military fixated on what it per-
ceived to be the most unique aspect of the use of these weapons – what 
soldiers thought about them and how they were anticipated to react to 
the use of nuclear weapons near to their positions. Consequently, psy-
chology came to play a key role in preparing U.S. servicemen to fight on 
the atomic battlefield and to adapt to nuclear weapons. In 1948, Colo-
nel James P. Cooney, the chief of the Radiological Branch, Division of 
Military Application, of the nascent Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
told an audience of his conclusions after having participated in nuclear-
Air force officers stand directly below ground zero for an atmospheric nuclear 
test, attempting to prove that these nuclear tests are safe. Las Vegas, Nevada, 
18 July 1957. U.S. Government
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weapons testing: “I have observed the reactions of the military, who were 
not acquainted with the technical details on two missions, Bikini and Eni-
wetok, and the fear reaction of the uninitiated is appalling.” The solution 
seemed obvious: “Psychological training for the military level of accept-
able radiation hazard is possible and should be prosecuted, even if opera-
tional training is not.”26
In 1951, the Pentagon contracted with researchers at two universi-
ties to design and analyse programs intended to educate and motivate 
soldiers in order to better prepare for nuclear war.27 These programs and 
materials were to be tested on military personnel scheduled to take part 
in battlefield manoeuvres during upcoming atomic tests. The soldiers 
would then be tested for their responses to the materials, so that they 
might be refined and improved. In this way, the atomic soldiers were to 
become both physical and psychological guinea pigs.
The tests were designed to assess the effectiveness on the soldiers of 
various indoctrination techniques and to gauge their responses to the 
weapons’ detonations. The psychological exercises and the briefings they 
reinforced also functioned to instruct the soldiers in how to feel about 
the bomb, encouraging them to see it as just another extension of the 
machinery of warfare and not an entirely different category.28
The two programs set out to measure two different sets of data. Psy-
chologists from George Washington University in Washington, D.C., 
established the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO), which 
focused on gauging the effectiveness of the education and indoctrination 
programs presented to troops who took part in atomic tests. HumRRO 
researchers administered questionnaires before and after soldiers partici-
pated in tests to determine if they had retained the information they had 
26 James P. Cooney, “Psychological Factors in Atomic Weapons,” Speech before the American 
Public Health Association, November 12, 1948, Federation of American Scientists papers, Uni-
versity of Chicago Library.
27 Howard Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers: American victims of nuclear experiments (Boston: Bea-
con Press, 1980), 40–41.
28 Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO), Desert Rock I: A psychological study of troop 
reactions to an atomic explosion, Technical Report 1 (TR-1), Washington, DC, February 1953; 
Human Resources Research Office, Desert Rock IV: Reactions of an armored infantry battalion 
to an atomic bomb maneuver, Technical Report 2 (TR-2) Washington, DC, August 1953.
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received during the briefings in Nevada and if the briefings had success-
fully alleviated their fear of the weapons.29
Human-behaviour specialists from the Johns Hopkins University 
Operations Research Office (ORO) set out to measure troops’ levels of fear 
and anxiety during the actual weapons tests.30 While HumRRO worked to 
gauge the effectiveness of indoctrination efforts aimed at the servicemen, 
ORO researchers sought to measure the anxiety and fear among participants 
in weapons tests through such somatic indicators as heart rate and perspira-
tion rate before, during, and after the tests. ORO’s physical measurements 
detected much higher levels of anxiety than HumRRO’s assessments, which 
were largely based on voluntary responses to written questionnaires.31
“A major objective of this exercise,” HumRRO’s Technical Report 
No. 1 stated, “was to evaluate psychologically the troops’ reactions to the 
maneuver, before indoctrination, after indoctrination, after the detona-
tion, and after a lapse of about three weeks. Attitude research techniques 
as well as psychological measures were used to estimate (1) the effective-
ness of the indoctrination procedures in increasing the troops’ knowl-
edge about atomic warfare and (2) the effects of the detonation, together 
with its accompanying consequences, on the troops’ confidence in their 
ability to do well in A-bomb fighting.”32
The HumRRO analysis of Desert Rock IV in 1953 concluded that 
there was evidence of “both the presence of fear ... and the absence of dis-
ruption of performance.” However, the conclusion that the performance 
was not impaired should not be considered grounds for not funding a 
further, more nuanced study, since “less easily observed aspects of fear 
may be important in serving to prepare or energize men to react in an 
emergency situation.”33
29 HumRRO, Bibliography of Reports: As of 30 June 1958 (Washington, DC: George Washing-
ton University, 1958): 1.
30 The Operations Research Office was established by the U.S. Army at Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity in 1948 and served as the Army’s civilian “think tank,” much as the RAND corporation did 
for the Air Force.
31 Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers, 46–48. ORO researchers would come to play a central role in 
designing Cold War psychological-warfare techniques.
32 HumRRO, Desert Rock I, x.
33 HumRRO, Desert Rock IV, 52–53.
182 Robert A. Jacobs
The results of these studies were integrated into military planning for 
the atomic battlefield. Writing in the magazine Army in 1956, General John 
E. Dahlquist advised that “the way the survivor of an atomic blast reacts 
depends on how well his leaders have prepared him for this moment. If 
they have led him well he will, at this supreme moment, become his own 
leader.”34
There were, however, voices of dissent within the military. Some of 
these critics thought that the preparation of soldiers to perform on the 
atomic battlefield should go beyond indoctrination and exposure to blasts 
from “safe” distances. In 1959, Major John T. Burke, an Army human-
engineering specialist, advocated “shock training.” He theorized that 
unless troops were exposed to the realistic horrors of nuclear war, lectures 
would be useless. Burke proposed a nuclear shock course, where “within 
appropriate radii of ground zero, every horror of the nuclear battlefield 
will be duplicated as realistically as possible. The area will be strewn 
with blood and plastic replicas of dismembered human bodies. Sicken-
ing stenches will emanate from carcasses and chemicals ... on every side 
he will be attacked by blinded comrades.” Only through such training, 
he felt, could soldiers truly be expected to perform adequately in actual 
nuclear combat. “Eventually this procedure will engender both respect 
for nuclear effects and confidence through familiarity.”35 Burke clearly 
felt that the performance of soldiers on the atomic battlefield depended 
more strongly on their ability to deal with shock and horror than it did on 
their indoctrination, a perspective he termed realism.
Conclusion
By 1954 both the United States and the former Soviet Union had devel-
oped thermonuclear weapons with yields thousands of times larger than 
those used in the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The March 
1954 Bravo Test conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands 
34 John E. Dahlquist, “We Will Survive if We Have Leadership,” Army 6 (1956): 34–36, italics 
added.
35 John T. Burke, “Mind against Nukes,” Army vol. 10 (1959): 55.
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resulted in a civilian casualty from radiation sickness of a fisherman 
located 100 km away from the epicentre of the detonation, far beyond 
any effects from the blast or heat of the weapon. Yet planning and training 
for a nuclear ground war to be fought in the defence of Western Europe 
persisted. Even after nuclear weapons had been placed onto missiles, 
and then MIRVed missiles (missiles with multiple, independently targe-
table warheads), there remained a separate target category in American 
nuclear targeting in support of ground troops engaged in combat in Cen-
tral Europe. In the early days of nuclear missile targeting three classes of 
targets were designated. BRAVO targets were the sites of Soviet nuclear 
assets, a primary target in a direct nuclear confrontation between the two 
superpowers. DELTA targets were designed to degrade the enemy’s indus-
trial capacity, and were concentrated on Soviet urban and manufacturing 
areas. ROMEO targets were designated as supporting NATO troops in 
a ground war with the Soviet Union, presumably in Germany and other 
parts of Western Europe.36 It is easy to imagine that nuclear weapons that 
were placed on intercontinental ballistic missiles were of a yield that their 
use in any battlefield scenario would devastate the friendly troops as well 
as the enemy combatants, and could quickly compel both sides up the 
escalation ladder to the point that both BRAVO and DELTA targets were 
also being attacked.37 Thus, the use of nuclear weapons, either tactical or 
strategic, on an imaginary battlefield in Western Europe, could result in a 
direct and full-scale thermonuclear war between the superpowers against 
each other’s military forces and urban populations.
The Army’s reflexive insistence on the importance of tactical nuclear 
weapons for use by or in support of infantry soldiers reflects a number of 
important developments. First, after World War Two the previous Army 
Air Corps had been separated out into the U.S. Air Force. This reflected 
36 Robert Jacobs, “The Bravo Test and the Death and Life of the Global Ecosystem in the Early 
Anthropocene,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 13(29): 1 (20 July 2015).
37 Use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would be calibrated for blast and heat effects to 
impact enemy soldiers. For this to be the case the weapons would have to be detonated at a 
height that would allow the fireball to be close enough to ground level that the subsequent 
radioactive fallout would affect areas far from the detonation point. For a contemporary discus-
sion of theories of escalation see, Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and scenarios (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965).
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both the increasing importance of aerial bombardment, and that airplanes 
were the first and most essential delivery system for nuclear weapons, as 
had been the case in the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This 
loss of an entire corps of the Army left it fighting for resources, now dis-
tributed between four service branches rather than the previous three, and 
asserting its relevance in the imagined nuclear wars of the future. Even 
as nuclear weapons surpassed the yield whereby they could be employed 
in any manner that guaranteed the safety of nearby friendly troops, the 
Army persisted in strategizing battlefield tactics in which infantrymen 
and nuclear weapons would share the same horizon. Beyond this, they 
persisted in training troops during actual nuclear weapon tests, subject-
ing them to risk in an effort to psychologically acclimate them to nuclear 
detonations.
The essential similarity of this imagined nuclear war, and ground 
engagements in Europe during World War Two embossed a strategic 
and tactical integration onto Army battlefield commanders that merely 
extended World War Two tactics to a battlefield that now included 
nuclear weapons. While the weapons that had actually been used dur-
ing World War Two had not been used in Europe, or on a battlefield that 
had American troops nearby (or even in country), the Army’s model 
remained a nuclear ground war fought with friendly troops in close prox-
imity to the weapon’s effects. This reflected the belief that the enemy in 
a nuclear war would be the Soviet Union, and that the likely scenario 
for this war would be a Soviet incursion into Western Europe that both 
reflected the Red Army’s progression through Europe in World War Two, 
and also the experience and tactics required to fight against the Nazis 
in those very same locations. For these strategists and battlefield com-
manders, nuclear weapons were simply bigger bombs. The exposure of so 
many American soldiers to fallout radiation during their participation in 
nuclear weapon testing in Nevada reveals a dismissal of the importance 
of protecting American troops from fallout following the use of tactical 
nuclear  weapons on the battlefields of a nuclear European theatre.
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